













International	 Criminal	 Tribunal	 for	 Rwanda	 (ICTR)	 by	 applying	 a	 trauma	 lens	 to	 the	
narratives	 that	 emerge	 on	 the	 witness	 stand	 and	 by	 contrasting	 those	 with	 a	 survivor	
testimony.	It	compares	the	recollection	of	a	 traumatic	experience	with	the	production	of	
legal	meaning.	 To	 do	 so,	 it	 focuses	 specifically	 on	 a	 survivor	 testimony	 shared	with	 the	
author	at	the	Rwandan	Nyange	memorial	in	2014	where	the	crimes	in	question	happened,	
and	 the	 ICTR	The	Prosecutor	vs	Athanase	Seromba	 trial	 that	 relates	 to	 the	events	at	 that	
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This	 paper	 contrasts	 the	 recollection	 of	 a	 traumatic	 experience	 with	 the	 production	 of	 legal	
meaning.	To	do	 so,	 it	 analyses	 and	 compares	 a	 survivor	 testimony	 that	was	 conducted	at	 the	






humanity	 and	 genocide;	 in	 2006	 the	 ICTR	 Trial	 Chamber	 III	 (hereafter	 the	 Chamber)	 found	









However,	 in	 pursuing	 such	 an	 inquiry,	 it	 should	 be	 acknowledged	 from	 the	 outset	 that	 the	
dialogue	 between	 the	 discipline	 of	 law,	 (poststructuralist)	 trauma	 and	 narrative	 studies	 is	
characterised	 by	 epistemological	 boundaries.	 Although	 a	 new	 awareness	 of	 trauma	 in	 legal	
practice	has	recently	emerged,	this	scholarship	has	been	limited	to	the	lawyer‐client	relationship	







killing	 the	 victim	or	 the	witnesses	…	but	 rather	 in	obtaining	 the	 silence	 of	 the	witnesses,	 the	








understanding	 how	 the	 individual	 is	 positioned	 as	 a	 survivor	 in	 the	 testimonial	 process.	 The	
modes	of	testimony	construct	the	survivor	as	a	person	who	has	experienced	an	uncanny	event	
and	remembers	it	whereas	a	tribunal	constructs	the	witness	as	simple	evidence	to	make	the	legal	
case.	 This	 highlights	 the	 different	 structural	 preconditions	 in	which	 traumatic	 narratives	 are	
















read	 the	 survivor	 testimony	 produced	 in	 the	 testimonial	 process	 against	 The	 Prosecutor	 vs	
Seromba	trial	(hereafter	the	Seromba	case)	and	read	trauma	into	both	narrative	accounts.	This	








criminal	 trials,	 and	of	 how	history	 is	written	by	 international	 criminal	 trials,	 as	well	 as	 some	
ethical	reflections	on	writing	about	violence	and	trauma.		
	








testimony,	 in	order	 to	propose	a	new	methodology	that	allows	a	different	and,	 in	 fact,	deeper	
understanding	 of	 the	 trial	 process	 at	 international	 courts.	 Although	 the	 article	 illustrates	 its	





This	 article	 seeks	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 project	 of	 southern	 criminology	 by	 applying	 trauma,	
narrative	 studies	 and	 testimony	 to	 an	 international	 legal	 phenomenon.	 The	 inquiries	 of	
mainstream	criminology	largely	focus	on	the	global	North,	often	neglecting	patterns	of	violence,	




and	 Sozzo	 2016:	 3).	 At	 present,	 ciminology	 remains	 largely	 blind	 to	 the	 cultural	 and	
transformative	aspects	of	violence	and	post‐violence	contexts;	it	tends	to	ground	its	analysis	in	




its	 legacy	 is	understood	and	addressed,	 legally.	Crimes	on	a	 large	scale,	mainly	categorised	as	
crimes	against	humanity	and	genocide,	do	not	only	concern	the	individual	(legal)	responsibility	
of	 an	 ‘other’	 but,	 as	 Edgar	 Faure	 argues,	 concern	 ‘a	 criminal	 enterprise	 against	 the	 human	
condition’	 (cited	 in	 Hirsh	 2001:	 533).	 Similarly,	 Hannah	 Arendt	 has	 famously	 argued	 in	 the	
context	of	the	historical	Eichmann	trial	that	‘genocide	is	an	attack	upon	human	diversity	as	such,	
that	 is,	 upon	 characteristics	 of	 the	 “human	 status”	 without	 which	 the	 words	 “mankind”	 or	
“humanity”	would	be	devoid	meaning’	(Arendt	1994:	268‐69).	This	is	to	say,	writing,	addressing	
and	acting	upon	such	crimes	requires	us	to	look	beyond	metropolitan	readings	of	delinquency	
and	 criminal	 behaviour	 and	 to	 develop	 novel	 epistemological	 and	 legal	 tools	 of	 knowledge	









force	 by	 the	 Rwandan	 Patriotic	 Front	 (RPF)	 that	 was,	 at	 that	 time,	 a	 rebel	 movement.	 The	
International	 Criminal	 Tribunal	 for	 Rwanda	 (hereafter	 the	 Tribunal)	 was	 established	 by	 the	
United	Nations	in	1994	in	response	to	the	heinous	crimes	committed	in	Rwanda.	The	Tribunal	
aimed	to	prosecute	genocide	and	violations	of	human	rights	under	international	humanitarian	
law.	The	statute	provided	 the	Tribunal	with	 the	power	 to	prosecute	persons	believed	to	have	
committed	 genocide	 or	 crimes	 against	 humanity,	 and	persons	 believed	 to	 have	 committed	 or	




Lakes	 Region	 of	 Africa	 (Humphrey	 2003).7	 The	 Tribunal	 completed	 its	 last	 (appeal)	 case	 in	
November	 2015.	 According	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	 Mechanism	 for	 International	 Criminal	
Tribunals	website	 (http://unictr.unmict.org/en/tribunal),	 the	 legacy	website	 of	 the	 ICTR,	 the	




atrocities	are	 important	 considerations	of	 this	article.	As	with	regard	 to	 the	 latter,	 there	 is	an	
expectation	that	international	trials	produce	a	historical	record	of	what	happened	in	the	countries	
concerned	 (Gaynor	 2012;	 Osiel	 2012;	 Wilson	 2011).	 Israeli	 Prime	 Minister	 Ben‐Gurion,	 for	
example,	stressed	before	the	start	of	the	historical	Eichmann	trial	that	 ‘it	is	necessary	that	our	
youth	remember	what	happened	to	the	Jewish	people.	We	want	them	to	know	the	most	important	







conspiracy	 in	 genocide,	 where	 it	 is	 paramount	 for	 the	 prosecution	 and	 the	 Trial	 Chamber,	
respectively,	 to	 establish	 the	 broader	 historical	 context	 the	 crimes	 are	 embedded	 in	 and	 that	





Since	 the	 Nuremberg	 trials,	 the	 evidentiary	 foundation	 in	 international	 criminal	 law	 has	
fundamentally	 changed	 (May	 and	Wierda	 1998/1999).	 Whereas	 the	 Nuremberg	 trial	 almost	
exclusively	relied	on	documentary	evidence,	the	more	recent	international	tribunals	heavily	rely	
on	 witnesses	 to	 build	 the	 legal	 case.	 The	 historical	 Eichmann	 trial	 was	 the	 first	 trial	 that	




Even	though	the	human	witness	gives	rise	 to	 the	vulnerability	of	establishing	a	 truth	 ‘beyond	
reasonable	 doubt’	 (Felman	 2002:	 134),	 the	 recent	 international	 trials	 heavily	 rely	 on	 human	
witnesses	(May	and	Wierda	1998/1999:	743;	see	also	Combs	2016).	In	fact,	witnesses	are	the	
pillar	 of	 international	 criminal	 trials.	 This	development	 is	partly	 due	 to	 the	 complexity	of	 the	








updated)	 (hereafter,	 the	 Rules)	 do	 not	 define	 the	 witness	 other	 than	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
admissibility	 of	 evidence.	 The	 same	 holds	 true	 for	 the	 Seromba	 judgment	 that	 only	 refers	 to	








can	unfold.	 In	and	 through	 this	process,	 the	person	who	has	experienced	violence	comes	 into	
existence	as	a	survivor	rather	than	just	as	evidence.9	I	argue	it	is	the	mode	of	testimony	 in	this	
particular	process	that	is	crucial	in	understanding	how	the	individual	is	positioned	as	a	survivor.	









can	 therefore	 be	 understood	 as	 storytelling	 to	 an	 emphatic	 other.	 Moreover,	 Laub	 (2005)	
develops	 different	 characteristics	 such	 as	 the	 dialogical	 relationship	 between	 survivor	 and	
listener,	the	reaffirmation	of	the	story	and	the	secret	‘password’	that	together	form	the	necessary	






collecting	 ‘survivor	 testimonies’	 from	 particular	 memorial	 sites	 and	 comparing	 individual	
narratives	of	what	happened	with	official	narratives	and	‘architectonical’	narratives	inscribed	in	










as	 very	 remote	 memorials	 mainly	 unknown	 to	 outsiders	 (for	 example,	 at	 Kanduha,	 Kinazi,	
Cyahinda	or	Cyanika).	In	addition,	I	covered	the	different	provinces	so	as	to	have	a	geographical	
balance,	something	which	is	particularly	important	given	that	the	genocide	played	out	differently	
across	 the	 provinces.	 In	 total,	 I	 interviewed	 around	 40	 individuals,	 including	 ‘care‐takers’,	
memorial	staff,	 staff	of	survivor	organisations	such	as	 Ibuka	and	Avega,	staff	of	 the	CNLG	and	
individuals	 remotely	 involved	 in	 commemoration	 and	 the	 memorials.	 I	 also	 conducted	 two	

























(Polletta	 et	 al	 2011:	 112).	 One	 of	 these	 formal	 features	 is	 what	 is	 termed	 the	 ‘Aristotelian	
configuration’	 (Ricoeur	 1984).	 Ricoeur	 argues	 that	 when	 stories	 are	 told	 there	 is	 a	 certain	
pressure	 to	 deliver	 them	 within	 an	 Aristotelian	 conventional	 narrative	 configuration,	 one	 in	
which	concordance	looms	large,	where	there	is	a	sense	of	the	connection	between	events,	and	
where	 the	conclusion	 is	 ‘congruent	with	 the	episodes	brought	 together	by	 the	story’	 (Ricoeur	
1984:	67).	Thus,	stories	are	narratives	told	according	to	the	conventions	of	linearity,	continuity,	








Part	of	 this	 ‘wholeness’	 is	time:	 time	 lies	at	 the	heart	of	narrative.	On	this	point,	 Jenny	Edkins	
describes	the	linear	or	narrative	time:	
	








mass	 atrocity,	 so	 does	 language	 (Edkins	 2003:	 8;	 see	 also	 Scarry	 1985).	 In	 that	 sense,	 the	
traumatic	 experience	keeps	one	 from	 forming	 a	meaningful	 narrative.	Narrative	 time	and	 the	



































the	witness	stand	questions	such	as	 ‘are	you	sure’	or	 ‘I	have	heard	you	saying	 this	differently	
before’,	or	‘evidence	suggest’.	This	excerpt	from	a	cross‐examination	of	a	defence	witness	by	the	






Friday,	 the	 15th	 of	 April	 …	 ‘The	 name	 of	 the	 priest	 who	 was	 with	 the	
gendarmes,	was	that	name	mentioned	by	your	leader?’		
Now	Mr	Moses’s	 question	 concerning	 that	 episode:	 ‘Was	 the	name	of	 the	














































as	a	witness	 (a	 stage	 of	 the	process	 known	as	 the	 examination‐in‐chief).	The	narrative	of	 the	
witness	is	put	under	scrutiny	and	the	meaning	of	the	content	is	heavily	debated	between	him	and	
























































asking	 witness	 SE13,	 ‘is	 that	 correct?’	 or	 ‘is	 that	 right?’	 He	 thereby	 reduces	 the	 events	 to	




atmosphere	 in	 which	 the	 church	 was	 demolished?	 You	 state	 that	
Nkinamubanzi	 was	 there,	 and	 that	 he	 was	 driving	 the	 bulldozer.	 What	
happened	thereafter?	Did	you	remain	there	to	observe	what	happened?		
A.	 Assailants	had	come	from	practically	everywhere.	The	doors	to	the	church	













do	 as	 of	 the	 12th	 of	 April.	 Apart	 from	 those	who	were	 inside	 the	 church	
[pause]	those	who	had	sought	refuge	in	their	homes	had	been	killed.	People	






























When	 the	 plane	 crashed	 [in]	 this	 district	 of	 Nyange	 they	 started	 to	 kill	 in	 the	





letter	 to	me	because	 I	was	a	business	man	at	 that	 time.	The	 letter	said	 that	 the	
authorities	would	need	my	car.	The	letter	reads	‘according	to	the	security	meeting	
you	have	 to	bring	your	 car	 on	11	April	 today	at	 4.15pm	 for	 the	 security	 of	 the	
commune’	 [Jacques	 actually	 showed	 me	 the	 letter	 that	 he	 kept	 ever	 since	 he	
received	 it.]	Despite	of	so	many	Hutus	having	cars,	 I	was	the	only	one	who	was	





































the	 church.	 On	 that	 point	 the	 judgment	 compounds,	 ‘13	 witnesses	 testified	 to	 having	 seen	 a	
bulldozer	 at	 Nyange	 church,	 while	 7	 others	 mentioned	 the	 presence	 of	 two	 bulldozers’.	 The	










by	 a	 precise	 number	 of	 bulldozers.	 As	 Molly	 Andrews	 reminds	 us,	 traumatic	 narratives	 are	























































against	 humanity’	 and,	 on	 the	 other,	 to	 the	 very	 human	 nature	 of	 survival.	 The	 testimonial	
process,	in	a	relationship	between	listener,	the	‘other’	and	narrator,	is	the	place	and	the	process	
in	which	the	traumatic	experience	comes	into	existence	and	is	therefore	knowable.	We	become	









































teachers	 [pause]	 so	 Father	 Seromba	 had	 given	 to	 these	 people	 lodgings,	
accommodation	 at	 the	 presbytery.	 But	 on	 the	 14th,	 when	 they	 held	 the	

























































































This	 examination‐in‐chief	 illustrates	 how	 the	 prosecutor	 attempts	 to	 establish	 a	 coherent	
sequence	of	the	events	that	happened.	In	the	line	of	questioning	the	prosecutor	continues	to	lead	
the	witness	through	each	day,	until	15	April	when	the	witness	fled	the	parish	thereby	focusing	on	







the	assailants	at	us,	up	until	 the	time	when	I,	myself,	 fled;	 that	was	in	the	














































the	 language	of	 law,	 there	must	be	an	exact	chronicle	ordering	of	 temporality.	However,	 such	
precise	temporal	order	can	pose	difficulties	for	traumatic	testimony.		
	
When	 looking	 at	 narratives	 on	 the	 witness	 stand,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 how	 time	 is	
experienced	by	a	survivor	of	atrocity	as	opposed	to	how	legal	procedures	integrate	time	aspects	
in	 constructing	 legal	meaning	 of	 an	 event.	When	 listening	 to	 a	 testimony	 the	 listener	 usually	
ascribes	meaning	to	what	has	been	said	using	a	chronological	timeframe	(beginning,	middle	and	
end)	(Edkins	2003:	xiv‐xv).	As	aforementioned,	the	emplotment	brings	single	occurrences	in	a	
chronological	 order.	 Trauma,	 however,	 changes	 the	 conceptions	 of	 time	 in	 the	 body	 of	 the	
survivor	(LaCapra	2001:	90).	Lawrence	Langer	compounds	further	on	that	point	that,	in	the	body	
of	a	survivor,	there	exist	two	times	(Langer	1997:	57‐58):	a	chronological	and	a	durational	time.	

























die.	This	account	also	 talks	of	despair	 and	hope	 that	 is	betrayed	when	he	 recalls	 the	meeting	
saying	that	they,	the	Tutsi	in	the	church,	thought	the	leaders	would	discuss	ways	to	save	them.		
	










the	 difficulties	 of	 the	 trial	 to	 hear	 and	 address	 the	 trauma	 of	 genocide	 and	 crimes	 against	
humanity.	Felman	reminds	us	that	there	are	limitations	in	the	possibility	of	seeing	and	hearing	
trauma.	She	argues	that	there	exists	a	structural	exclusion	from	our	factual	frame	of	reference	













understood	 and	 interpreted	 in	 the	 trial	 process.	 The	 analysis	 has	 shown	 how	 the	 cross‐
examination,	 the	 law‐type	 questioning,	 produce	 legal	 narratives	 that	 not	 only	 distance	 and	
totalise	the	singularities	of	‘events’	but	also	form	a	legal	temporality	that	fails	to	include,	admit	or	
















testifies	 to	 in	 court.	 But	 as	 the	 analysis	 has	 revealed,	 the	 experience	 produces	 traumatic	
narratives	that	lack	coherency,	closure	and	consistency.		
	
Reading	 trauma	 into	 the	 witness	 stand	 might	 illuminate	 why	 the	 Chamber	 found	 so	 many	










The	 first	section	of	 this	paper	showed	 that,	 in	 the	early	stage	of	 the	 trial	process,	 the	witness	




contrast	 to	 Combs	 findings,	 that	 a	 more	 sympathetic	 understanding	 of	 traumatic	 testimony	
appreciates	that,	while	there	is	always	an	oath	to	tell	the	truth,	everything	in	this	truth	can	be	
forgotten	 and	 confused.	 A	 pure	 legal	 perspective	 neglects	 these	 fragments	 of	 both	 traumatic	



















today’s	 international	 trials	 leave	 little	 room	 for	witnesses	 to	 tell	 their	 stories	 (Dembour	 and	





















The	 analysis	 in	 this	 articles	 also	 engages	 with	 the	 critical	 work	 on	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
international	criminal	trials	really	can,	and	do,	write	history	(see	Wilson	2011:	1;	also	Gaynor	
2012;	 Simpson	 2007).	 It	 was	 shown	 how	 the	 trial	marks	what	 history	 remembers	 and	what	





This	 leads	 to	 the	 human	 experience	 of	 the	mass	 crime	 being	 cleared	 from	 the	 legal	 records.	
Therefore,	we	need	further	outlets	for	a	traumatic	past	to	emerge,	to	be	heard	and	understood	if	








law	 closes	 the	 possibility	 of	 reinterpretation	 and	 negotiation	 of	 the	 traumatic	 past,	 and	 the	
judgment	 closes	 all	 meanings	 by	 presenting	 a	 totality	 of	 facts.	 However,	 the	 archive	 of	 the	
tribunal(s)	preserves	the	trauma,	its	incoherence	and	inconsistency;	the	challenge	here	is	to	see,	








to	 ‘speak	 for	 the	 subaltern’	 or	 ‘give	 voice’	 to	 victims,	 particularly	 when	 the	 research	 is	
characterised	by	hierarchical	encounters	between	global	North	and	global	South.	Robben	and	
Nordstrom	 importantly	 note	 that	 ‘one	 can	 count	 the	 dead	 and	 measure	 the	 destruction	 of	
property,	but	victims	can	never	 convey	 their	pain	and	suffering	 to	us,	other	 than	 through	 the	




middle,	 end)	narrative	 structure	 that	 is	needed	 to	understand	and	 contextualise	what	 is	 said,	











































































fact.	 However,	 the	 Chamber	 could	 not	 establish	whether	 this	 happened	 through	 a	machete	 or	 through	 shooting	
(Seromba	Judgment,	01‐66‐0276/2:	para	200,	p.	56).	
19	Anasthase	Nkinamubanzi	appeared	before	court	as	well	and	was	a	defence	witness.	On	the	stand	he	claimed	that	he	






22	A	 report	by	 the	 International	 Federation	 for	Human	Rights	 into	 the	 treatment	of	witnesses	before	 the	Tribunal	
concluded	that	the	complaints	raised	by	those	survivor	organisations	were	justified	(October	2002,	No	329/2).	
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